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FORMAL REQUIREMENTS FOR CREATION OF THE OIL
AND GAS LESSEE'S INTEREST
WILLIAM D. WARREN*
The practice of the courts of employing almost as many varying and
contradictory descriptions of the nature of the lessee's interest under the
usual oil and gas lease as there are petroleum producing states has a his-
torical origin which is clearly traceable. In the latter half of the nineteenth
century as each of the known oil bearing states was slowly explored and
developed for petroleum, it fell the lot of their courts to solve the complicated
legal problems arising in this new and unique industry. Equipped with but
little accurate scientific knowledge about the physical behavior of oil and
gas, and often with no direct legal precedent, these courts found their task a
difficult one. It is not surprising that pioneer oil and gas judges turned for
guidance to doctrines of common law real property covering situations
seemingly analogous to those confronting them. A gradual, but haphazard,
reception of real property terminology into the law of oil and gas followed.
But the peg has never really fit the hole. No one term in real property law
has been found which for all purposes properly describes the oil and gas
lessee's interest. Thus, in casting about for real property precedent to govern
one petroleum law question the courts of a state came up with one descrip-
tion of the lessee's interest; however, with reference to different issue to be
resolved, the quest for common law analogy often yielded quite another
characterization. This tendency, when repeated through the years in the
several petroleum producing jurisdictions, has produced a markedly con-
flicting nomenclature. Thus in cases concerned with formal requirements for
the creation of the oil and gas lessee's interest the courts have, at one time
or another, described this interest as a determinable fee,' a profit a prendre,2 an
incorporeal hereditament, 3 more than an incorporeal hereditament, 4 a free-
hold,5 an interest in land,6 not an interest in land,7 a chattel interest s a
license,9 not a license,10 personal property 1 and real property.'
2
*Assistant Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University.
1. Jones v. Bevier, 59 S.W.2d 945, 948 (Tex. Civ. App. 1933).
2. Brinkman v. Empire Gas & Fuel Co., 120 Kan. 602, 245 Pac. 107, 110 (1926);
Rich v. Doneghey, 71 Okla. 204, 177 Pac. 86, 89 (1918).
3. Heller v. Dailey, 28 Ind. App. 555, 63 N.E. 490, 493 (1902); White v. Green,
103 Kan. 405, 173 Pac. 974, 975 (1918) ; Rich v. Doneghey, 71 Okla. 204, 177 Pac. 86,
89 (1918); Walla Walla Oil, Gas & Pipe Line Co. v. Vallentine, 103 Wash. 359, 174
Pac. 980, 981 (1918).
4. Terry v. Humphreys, 27 N.M. 564, 203 Pac. 539, 543 (1922).
5. Pure Oil Co. v. Evans, 369 Ill. 416, 17 N.E.2d 23, 24 (1938); Poe v. Ulrey,
233 Ill. 56, 84 N.E. 46, 48 (1908).
6. Ramage v. Wilson, 37 Ind. App. 532, 77 N.E. 368, 370 (1906) ; Beckett-Iseman
Oil Co. v. Backer, 165 Ky. 818, 178 S.W. 1084 (1915); Watson v. Rochmill, 137 Tex.
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It is understandable that under the influence of the great amount of
verbiage devoted to the task of affixing common law real property labels on
the lessee's interest in the opinions, some courts and legal writers have felt
that the legal terms used to characterize this interest are important factors in
deciding oil and gas cases. Admittedly, in certain limited areas of oil and gas
litigation the judicially recognized names ascribed to the lessee's interest are
variables of some import.' 3 But is the view that the oil and gas lessee's
interest is one thing in a state where the courts have given it a certain label
and a different and distinct interest in another state in which it is known by
a contrary decision supported by the actual holdings of the cases? It is the
object of this article to investigate in some detail the role of the legal
standards used to depict the nature of the oil and gas lessee's interest in
cases concerning the formal requirements for the creation of that interest.
A secondary aim is a nonexhaustive analysis of the general trends of
decisions concerning creation of the lessee's interest and their relationship
to the desired community goals for petroleum planning and development.
Just as the first problem in a study of the oil and gas lessee's interest
is the manner of creating such an interest, so must the primary inquiry into
the creation question itself be to examine the formalities which parties desiring
to enter into petroleum planning and development are required to meet to
make an agreement enforceable against others by the coercive forces of the
community. Incontestably, in this day of great civilian petroleum demand and
prolonged, oil-consuming military emergencies, the community's principal
objective in the area of creation of oil and gas interest should be to encourage
the making of those agreements which best promote the fullest uliliation of
the nation's petroleum resources. In some nations this objective is believed
to be best attained by having strict governmental supervision, if not, in fact,
complete national ownership of petroleum resources. It is, however, but a
565, 155 S.W.2d 783, 784 (1941); First State Bank of Wortham v. Bland, 291 S.W.
650, 652 (1927).
7. Walla Walla Oil, Gas & Pipe Line Co. v. Vallentine, 103 Wash. 359, 174 Pac.
980, 981 (1918).
8. See note 7 supra.
9. Heller v. Dailey, 28 Ind. App. 555, 63 N.E. 490, 492 (1902) (a license coupled
with an interest in land) ; Walla Walla Oil, Gas & Pipe Line Co. v. Vallentine, 103 Wash.
359, 174 Pac. 980, 981 (1918).
10. Gatewood v. Graves, 241 S.W. 264, 266 (Tex. Civ. App. 1922).
11. De Hart v. Enright, 93 Misc. 213, 157 N.Y. Supp. 46, 51 (Sup. Ct. 1916).
12. Lambert v. Gant, 290 S.W. 548, 550 (Tex. Civ. App. 1926).
13. For a discussion on the importance of the name annexed to the lessee's interest,
see Walker, The Nature of the Property Interest Created by an Oil and Gas Lease
in Texas, 7 TEXAs L. Rnv. 539 (1929). The use of the word "variable" in the
text of this article is a recognition of the fact that there are several elements which
influence the judicial response in varying degrees: the objective facts of the case, the
claims of the parties, the legal standards or technical doctrines brought to bear on the
issues before it by the court and the policy norms invoked by the courts. This article
is primarily concerned with legal standards as variables. Lasswell and McDougal, Legal
Education and Public Policy, 52 YALE L.J. 203 (1943).
[ VoL,. ,5
OIL AND GAS LESSEE'S INTEREST
part of the American philosophical heritage to believe that in this country
the goal can be very largely achieved through prudent use of that familiar in-
strumentality of free enterprise-the free-volition agreement-making process.
If the vital goal of fullest resource utilization is to be entrusted to the
vehicle of the free initiative agreement-making process, then a proper sec-
ondary community objective would seem to be the improvement of such a
process by ridding the paths agreement-makers must follow of those arbitrary
and functionless formal technicalities which serve only to obstruct agree-
ment-making. It is inevitable, however, that in its desire to smooth the way
for agreement-makers by demanding as few formal requirements for the
creation of the oil and gas lessee's interest as possible, the community must
collide with its own age-old interest in making sure an agreement with cer-
tain terms was actually entered into by ascertainable, serious-minded
parties and meant by them to have legal effect. To guarantee these things,
some formal safeguards are needed. Where is the optimum point at which
the formalities insure that a solemn agreement has been made, yet are not
unduly obstructive to those desiring to enter into agreement-making? Further-
more, do the diverse legalistic descriptions of the lessee's interest prove a
guide in this field of inquiry?
Seriatim consideration will be given to the more common formalities,
(1) the signed writing, (2) the seal, (3) consideration, (4) delivery, (5)
acknowledgment and (6) recording.
1. Signed Writing
A minimal formal requirement for the creation of the oil and gas lessee's
interest is a signed writing.14 The functions of form have been described as
evidentiary and cautionary ;15 the former satisfying the community's interest
in seeing that an agreement was actually made, the latter contributing toward
the desired serious-mindedness in the participants. A proposed third function
of form is its channeling or canalizing effect, that of offering a legal frame-
14. See notes 18-25 infra for cases sustaining this proposition. See, generally, MIMLs
AND WILLINGHAZI, OIL AND GAS 54 (1926) ; 2 SuMMRs, OIL AND GAs § 226 (Perm.
ed. 1938) ; Walker, The Nature of Property Interests Created by an Oil and Gas Lease
in Texas, 7 TEXAs L. Rxv. 539 (1929). The prevailing view is that the signing re-
quirement extends only to the lessor; the nonsigning lessee may be bound by his
acceptance of the lease. Chandler v. Hart, 161 Cal. 405, 119 Pac. 516 (1911) (lessee
bound by acceptance and lessor held to have waived any right he might have to
require lessee to sign by delivering it to lessee unsigned) ; Castro v. Gaffey, 96 Cal. 421,
31 Pac. 363, 364 (1892) (no acceptance shown); Indianapolis Natural Gas Co. v.
Kibby, 135 Ind. 357, 35 N.E. 392 (1893); Texas & Pacific Coal & Oil Co. v. Patton,
240 S.W. 303 (Tex. Comm. App. 1922); Lawson v. Kirchner, 50 W. Va. 344, 40
S.E. 344 (1901) ; Walker, supra. But cf. Lieber v. Ouachita Natural Gas & Oil Co., 153
La. 160, 95 So. 538 (1922).
15. Fuller, Consideration and Form, 41 COL. L. REv. 799 (1941). See also on the




work into which the party may fit his actions, easily recognizable to courts
as an attempt to do a legally effective act.16 That the signed written lease
used in the creation of the oil and gas lessee's interest does provide "evidence
of the existence and purport of the contract, in case of controversy," 1 cannot
be questioned. It is equally clear that this formality is a deterrent to incon-
siderate action, and does force the participants to reduce their demands into
legally significant and recognizable language. Nor is it objectionable as being
obstructive to the agreement-making process.
The requirement of a signed writing for creation of the lessee's interest
is thus socially desirable. The doctrinal course through which this social need
has been translated into legal reality has been thought to depend on the
judicially accepted description of the lessee's interest prevailing in the
jurisdiction in question. So it is that in cases concerning the formal require-
ment of a signed writing there is much discussion of the nature of the
lessee's interest. At least three theories, all of which bear on the nature of
this interest, are used to bring an oil and gas lease within the various
statutes of frauds. The Texas view is that an oil and gas lease is "a con-
veyance of an interest in land"'8 and is an "estate of inheritance" under a
statute saying, "No estate of inheritance or freehold, or for a term of more
than one year in lands and tenements shall be conveyed from one to another
unless ... by an instrument in writing. ."9 Another line of cases finds an
oil and gas lease to be a lease of real estate or an interest therein for more
than a stipulated period of from one to three years, hence within the pale of
the usual statute.2" Still other cases liken an oil and gas lease to a "contract
for the sale of lands, tenements, or hereditaments," 21 or "a contract for the
transfer and sale of an interest in lands," 22 and fit it into the statute of
frauds in that manner.23 An occasional case has simply assumed without
16. Fuller, supra note 15.
17. Fuller, supra note 15, at 800, quoting Austin.
18. Lockhart v. Williams, 144 Tex. 553, 192 S.W.2d 146 (1946) ; Watson v. Roch-
mill, 137 Tex. 565, 155 S.W.2d 783 (1941); First State Bank of Wortham v. Bland,
291 S.W. 650 (Tex. Civ. App. 1927) ; Lambert v. Gant, 290 S.W. 548 (Tex. Civ. App.
1926); Schmidt v. Baar, 283 S.W. 1115 (Tex. Civ. App. 1926); Priddy v. Green, 220
S.W. 243 (Tex. Civ. App. 1920). TRuss, TEXAS OIL AND GAs 100 (1929), speaks of an
oil and gas lease as "the sale of the minerals in place-the sale of realty" and declares
that the instrument must be in writing. This statement is quoted in Guerra v.
Chancellor, 103 S.W.2d 775, 778 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937) (oral agreement to extend date
of delay rental payments) and is adopted from that case into Noxon v. Cockburn, 147
S.W.2d 872, 874 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941) (parol agreement for the assignment of
lessee's interest).
19. TEx. STAT., Rav. Civ. art. 1288 (1948).
20. Meeks v. Adams Louisiana Co., 49 F. Supp. 489 (S.D. Ga. 1943); Sunburst
Oil and Gas Co. v. Neville, 79 Mont. 550, 257 P. 1016 (1927) ; De Hart v. Enright,
93 Misc. 213, 157 N.Y. Supp. 46 (Sup. Ct. 1916); Kennedy v. Burns, 84 W. Va. 701,
101 S.E. 156 (1919); Montana & Wyoming Oil Co. v. Gibson, 19 Wyo. 1, 113 Pac.
784 (1910).
21. Riffel v. Dieter, 159 Kan. 628, 157 P.2d 831 (1945).
22. Beckett-Iseman Oil Co. v. Backer, 165 Ky. 818, 178 S.W. 1084 (1915).
23. White v. Green, 103 Kan. 405, 173 Pac. 974 (1918) ; Robinson v. Smalley, 102
Kan. 842, 171 Pac. 1155 (1918); Sunburst Oil & Gas Co. v. Neville, 79 Mont. 550,
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discussion that somehow the statute of frauds necessarily extends to an oil
and gas lease.2 4 Independent Of the statute of frauds, a line of authority
holds that the lessee's interest is "incorporeal" and, as incorporeal interests
lay only in grant at common law, a writing is necessary to creat the modem
oil and gas lessee's interest.
2 5
The significant thing is that despite the bewildering assortment of
descriptive labels affixed to the lessee's interest 26 and the resourceful methods
used to hold that the creation of these various interests falls within the scope
of the various statutes of frauds, which normally do not mention oil and gas
leases at all, each court, with only one possible exception 2 7 has reached
exactly the same result: the lessee's interest, whatever it may be called,
must be created by a signed writing. This scarcely seems an area in which
the descriptive legal standards are of any real effect in conditioning the
judicial response.
Nor do the courts have difficulty in projecting the signed writing prereq-
uisite into agreements to give a lease at a later date.2 8 Here the usual statute
of frauds provision that a "sale of an interest in land" must be in writing is
commonly invoked; however, in a jurisdiction where a lessee's interest is
not considered an "estate in land" the judicial response does not differ.2 9 As
257 Pac. 1016 (1927) ; Kennedy v. Burns, 84 W. Va. 701, 101 S.E. 156 (1919). These
cases and those in note 20, supra, mention both the "lease of interest in real estate" and
"the contract for sale of interest in lands" theories with no clear indication of which
line of reasoning they adopt.
24. See, e.g., Prout v. Hoy Oil Co., 263 Ill. 54, 105 N.E. 26 (1914).
25. Callihan v. Bander, 117 Ind. App. 467, 73 N.E.2d 360, 362 (1947), where the
court said, "In the case of Heller v. Dailey . . . this court, in a well-reasoned opinion,
held that oil and gas leases created an exclusive and assignable interest in land; that
they were in the nature of an incorporeal hereditament (a kind of metaphysical
creature of the law) and as such could pass only by written instrument." Heller v.
Dailey, 28 Ind. App. 555, 63 N.E. 490 (1902); White v. Green, 103 Kan. 405, 173
Pac. 974 (1918); Kennedy v. Burns, 84 W. Va. 701, 101 S.E. 156 (1919).
26. See the terms used to describe the lessee's interest set out in the first paragraph
of this article.
27. In Walla Walla Oil, Gas & Pipe Line Co. v. Vallentine, 103 Wash. 359, 174
Pac. 980 (1918), a corporation was allowed to establish by parol its beneficial interest
in certain oil and gas leases purchased by and in the name of an agent of the
corporation. This case has been cited as an exception to the rule that an oil and gas
lease must be created by a written instrument but the actual holding seems to fall short
of establishing such a precedent. The case does, however, contain a dictum, 174 Pac.
at 981, to the effect that an oil and gas lease is not within proscription of the statute
of frauds. The court supports this statement by declaring that oil and gas leases"convey no interest in, nor create any incumbrance upon, the land or any oil or gas
found therein.'
28. See, e.g., Sunburst Oil and Gas Co. v. Neville, 79 Mont. 550, 257 Pac. 1016
(1927); Priddy v. Green, 220 S.W. 243 (Tex. Civ. App. 1920).
29. Robinson v. Smalley, 102 Kan. 842, 171 Pac. 1155 (1918), contains this
oft-quoted statement in answer to the plaintiff's contention that an agreement to make
an oil and gas lease need not be in writing because it does not relate to an interest
in land: "'While the court has held that an oil and gas lease of the kind under
consideration does not constitute a conveyance, will not support a mechanic's lien,
does not operate as a grant and severance of mineral in place, and creates no estate
proper in the land itself, it does create an incorporeal hereditament. A contract for
the sale of hereditaments, whether incorporeal or corporeal is within the sixth section
of the statute of frauds. Gen. Stat. 1915, § 4889.'
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the lessee's interest must be created by a writing, authority is uniform to the
effect that it must also be transferred by that formality5 0 It is generally
held that an agent's authority to make an agreement to lease," to make the
lease itself,22 or to assign the lessee's interest3 3 must be in writing, as must
modification of the lease.
34
2. Seal
Unfortunately the seal has yet to be abolished in some jurisdictions. Not
since grantors learned to write has the seal contributed to the evidentiary
aspects of form, and whatever slight aid it is in bringing about the desired
serious state of mind in the participants is today rendered superfluous by
other formal safeguards.35 Here is a situation where the minute contribution
made by a formality to the advancement of the policies underlying form is
grossly outweighed by the burden placed on the free volition agreement-
making process by erecting yet another obstacle in the agreement-maker's
path.
Although neither formal nor substantive bases for retaining it remain, the
seal is thought to be a requirement for the creation of the oil and gas lessee's
interest in those jurisdictions which require the seal in real estate con-
veyances and which consider an oil and gas lease such a conveyance. 0 How-
ever, no case has been found in which an oil and gas lease was avoided for
lack of a seal.
30. Beckett-Iseman Oil Co. v. Backer, 165 Ky. 818, 178 S.W. 1084 (1915) ; Noxon
v. Cockburn, 147 S.W.2d 872 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941); Blumrosen v. Burke, 296 S.W.
987 (Tex. Civ. App. 1927); First State Bank of Wortham v. Bland, 291 S.W. 650
(Tex. Civ. App. 1927); Gatewood v. Graves, 241 S.W. 962 (Tex. Civ. App. 1921);
Priddy v. Green, 220 S.W. 243 (Tex. Civ. App. 1920) ; Kennedy v. Burns, 84 W. Va.
701, 101 S.E. 156 (1919) ; Montana & Wyoming Oil Co. v. Gibson, 19 Wyo. 1, 113 Pac.
784 (1910).
31. See, e.g., Sunburst Oil and Gas Co. v. Neville, 79 Mont. 550, 257 Pac. 1016
(1927).
32. See, e.g., Meeks v. Adams Louisiana Co., 49 F. Supp. 489 (S.D. Ga. 1943);
Prout v. Hoy Oil Co., 263 Ill. 54, 105 N.E. 26 (1914).
33. See, e.g., Priddy v. Green, 220 S.W. 243 (Tex. Civ. App. 1920).
34. See, e.g., Riffle v. Dieter, 159 Kan. 628, 157 P.2d 831, 838 (1945) ("It is
also well settled upon unassailable grounds that if the original contract is required
to be in writing in order to be enforceable, any substantial modification of the con-
tract must likewise be in writing and signed by the party to be charged therewith") ;
Guerra v. Chancellor, 103 S.W.2d 775 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937) (oral agreement to
extend time for paying delay rentals). Contra: Crawford v. Bellevue & G. Natural Gas
Co., 183 Pa. 227, 38 Atl. 595 (1897). For cases holding an oral release of an oil and
gas lease ineffective, see Ramage v. Wilson, 37 Ind. App. 532, 77 N.E. 268 (1906);
Heller v. Dailey, 28 Ind. App. 555, 63 N.E. 490 (1902).
35. "In the wide open spaces where seals were seals . . . the likelihood is strong
that the seal made an excellent positive test for enforceability, and certainly as to the
seal all assurance that the positive test is a wise one vanishes when printed forms
containing '[L.S.]' are simply executed on the dotted line." Llewellyn, What Price
Contract? 40 YALE L.J. 738 (1931).
36. 2 SuMMERs, OIL AND GAS § 227 (Perm. ed. 1938) ; 4 TiFFANY, REAL PROPERTY
§ 1024 (3d ed. 1939). An occasional case has utilized the seal to bolster that other
sagging formality, consideration, and has held that the presence of the seal imports a
consideration. See, e.g., Greer v. Carter Oil Co., 373 II1. 168, 25 N.E.2d 805 (1940).
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3. Consideration
The controversy on whether consideration is a fundamental require-
ment for the creation of the oil and gas lessee's interest has been fought out
on a lofty legalistic plane. It has largely entailed scrutiny of the instruments
creating that interest, in the belief that if the true nature of such instruments
could be ascertained, the problem would be solved. If the oil and gas lease
is treated as a "conveyance," then unless it is operating under the Statute of
Uses, no consideration is said to be necessary; but if it is regarded as a
"contract," consideration emerges as a factor to be dealt with. 37 The better
writers contend that the oil and gas lease is a conveyance.3 8 The historical
foundation for this view is persuasive when it is recalled that the law of
contract was so ineffectual 9 that the medieval man did not contract that he
might have three cords of wood out of a forest for the next ten years, but
instead was granted the right to so much wood.40 One did not contract with
a religious house for room and board, one was granted an incorporeal
hereditament known as a corody for this purpose.
41
Walker's much quoted view is, "Rightly understood a lease is not an
executory contract but a present conveyance of an interest in land. .... 42
Hence, "It is submitted that . . . if an oil and gas lease is held to be a
conveyance of a determinable fee estate, the presence or absence of any
consideration . . . are irrelevant inquiries except upon the issue of fraud or
mistake; that the occasional judicial utterances otherwise are relics of the
period when oil and gas leases were regarded as option contracts in
[Texas] .-43
This writer respectfully submits that any attempt to determine the
necessity of consideration by forcing the modern oil and gas lease into the
molds of traditional common law terminology--"conveyance" or "contract"
37. 2 SUMMERS, OIL AND GAS § 234 (Perm. ed. 1938) ; 4 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY
§ 984 (3d ed. 1939) ; Walker, The Nature of the Property Interests Created by an
Oil and Gas Lease in Texas, 7 TEXAS L. REv. 539 (1929). On the general problem
of consideration, see the notable series of articles in 41 COL. L. Rv. 777-876 (1941) :
Llewellyn, On the Complexity of Consideration: A Foreword, 777; Sharp, Pacta Sunt
Servanda, 783; Fuller, Consideration and Form, 799; Mason, The Utility of Considera-
tion-A ComParative View, 849; Llewellyn, Common-Law Reform of Consideration:
Are There Measures? 863; and a review of this symposium by Dean Havighurst,
Consideration, Ethics and Administration, 42 COL. L. REV. 1 (1942).
38. 2 SuMImMS, OIL AND GAS § 734 (Perm. ed. 1938) ; Walker, The Nature of the
Property Interests Created by an Oil and Gas Lease in Texas, 7 TEXAS L. REv. 539
(1929).
39. "The yet feeble law of contract is supplemented by a generous liberality in the
creation of incorporeal things." 2 POLLOCK AND MAITLAND, HISTORY OF ENGLISH
LAw 146 (2d ed. 1923).
40. Ibid.
41. Id. at 134.
42. Walker, The Nature of the Property Interests Created by an Oil and Gas
Lease in Texas, 7 TEXAS L. REv. 1, 20 (1928) (italics in original).
43. Id. at 24, 25. In Jones v. Bevier, 59 S.W.2d 945 (Tex. Civ. App. 1933), where
a $1 consideration was recited but never paid, the court adopted the position of the
Walker article.
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-is fruitless. 4 Possessing features of both, the oil and gas lease of today
is clearly neither wholly "conveyance" nor "contract." It is a unique legal
act, and when this fact is accepted more than mere semantic purity will have
been achieved.
A more rational approach to the problem is a policy-oriented one.
45 If
the fullest utilization of community petroleum resources is our desideratum
and if we choose to achieve this through free-volition resource development
agreements, then we must encourage the free initiative agreement-making
process by ridding it of needless technicalities, fatal to all but the fore-
warned. However, an effective agreement-making process must have safe-
guards adequate to assure the community that an agreement consisting of
definite terms was actually made by serious-minded parties intending to do
a legally effective act. The conflict, then, should not be the conceptualistic
one of "conveyance" versus "contract," but the intensely practical one of
easy agreement-making against formal safeguards. The issue should be
joined on whether the contiibution of consideration to form outweighs its
obstruction to smooth petroleum agreement-making.
A careful review of the matter leads one to realize that any view which
credits the presence of consideration in an oil and gas lease with advancing
in any appreciable degree the community policies underlying form cannot
be supported. 46 It is difficult to discover any evidentiary purpose served by
consideration. "[A] perjurer stout enough to snatch a verdict by swearing to
a false promise would not have the slightest difficulty in snatching one by
swearing also to a false counter-promise. '47 Even in the situation where the
parties are honest but find themselves in dispute over the terms or existence
of the lease, other formal safeguards so far overshadow the consideration
element that the community would scarcely be justified in withholding its
enforcement of the agreement because of the lack of this one piece of
evidence. Nor does consideration tend in any material way to force "expression
into a form which both the actors in the transaction and the judge may
readily recognize" s and thereby further the channeling function of form.
It may be contended that in the bilateral contract situation considera-
tion does perform a valuable cautionary function in producing the desired
serious-mindedness. 4 9 Perhaps the giving of a promise in return for another
44. See 1 SuMMERs, OIL AND GAS § 153 (Perm. ed. 1938) for an excellent dis-
cussion on the futility of ascribing common law labels to modern oil and gas leases
and the leases and the interests created thereby.
45. See generally, McDoUGAL AND HABER, PROPERTY, WEALTH, LAND: ALLOCATION,
PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT 475 et seq. (1948); McDougal, Future Interests Re-
stated: Tradition vs. Clarification and Reform, 55 HARV. L. REV. 1077 (1942).
46. Havighurst, Consideration, Ethics and Administration, 42 COL. L. REV. 1
(1942).
47. Id. at 7.
48. Id. at 6, 7.
49. Id. at 8, 9. See also Fuller, Consideration and Form, 41 COL. L. REV. 799, 805
(1941).
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promise does act as a deterrent to the promisor. However, the factual
probabilities that consideration might produce a cautionary effect in oil and
gas leasing are much more slight. The oil and gas lessee's handing of a
dollar over to the lessor scarcely insures deliberation on the lessor's part;
if it guarantees anything, it is caution on the part of the lessee. Yet only the
lessor's serious-mindedness need concern us, for only he has irrevocably
parted with anything in making an oil and gas lease. Under the modern form
of lease, the lessee may simply terminate a lease obtained in an improvident
moment by surrender or lapse, depending on the type of drilling clause
involved.5° The cases document this by showing that attacks on leases made
on the ground of lack of consideration are usually brought by lessors or
their successors in interest. 1 It has been said that "The need for investing
a particular transaction with some legal formality will depend on the extent
to which the guaranties that the formality would afford are rendered super-
fluous by forces native to the situation out of which the transaction arise.1
52
If this is true, it would seem the realization on the part of the lessor that he
is passing from his control for a period of five or ten years potentially valu-
able mineral rights would tend to place him in a sufficiently circumspect
frame of mind. It is apparent that this "natural formality," 53 firmly braced
50. The "drill or pay" type drilling clause requires the lessee to commence a well
on the premises within a certain time or to pay the lessor a rental for the privilege of
delaying drilling. For many years this clause has customarily been accompanied in
leases by a surrender clause allowing the lessee to terminate the lease at will. The"unless" type drilling cause provides if no well be commenced before a stated date,
the lease shall terminate as to both parties, unless the lessee on or before that date
shall pay or tender to the lessor a sum as a rental to cover deferring the commence-
ment of the well. The lessee can terminate the lease here by failing to do both the
alternatives, drill or pay rental. A surrender clause in the lessee's favor is sometimes
found attached to the "unless" type lease.
51. Brewster v. Lanyon Zinc Co., 140 Fed. 801 (8th Cir. 1905); Rechard v.
Cowley, 202 Ala. 337, 80 So. 419 (1918) ; Rogers v. Magnolia Oil & Gas Co., 156 Ark.
103, 245 S.W. 802 (1922) ; Sandrini v. Branch, 32 Cal. App. 2d 707, 90 P.2d 593 (1939) ;
Poe v. Ulrey, 233 Il1. 56, 84 N.E. 46 (1908) ; Sledd v. Munsell, 149 Kan. 110, 86 P.2d
567 (1939) ; Remple v. Shell Petroleum Corp., 134 Kan. 350, 5 P.2d 1094 (1931) ; Pitts-
burg Vitrified Paving and Building Brick Co. v. Bailey, 76 Kan. 42, 90 Pac. 803 (1907) ;
Ford v. Kentucky-West Virginia Gas Co 299 Ky. 455, 185 S.W.2d 953 (1945); Smith
v. Tullos, 195 La. 400, 196 So. 912 (1940) ; Raines v. Dunson, 145 La. 525, 82 So. 690
(1919) ; Murray v. Barnhart, 117 La. 1023, 42 So. 489 (1906) ; Boles v. Nash, 145 Okla.
120, 291 Pac. 800 (1930) ; Garber v. Hauser, 76 Okla. 292, 185 Pac. 436 (1919) ; Rich v.
Doneghey, 71 Okla. 204, 177 Pac. 86 (1918); Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Connellee,
11 S.W.2d 158 (Tex. Comm. App. 1928); Bost v. Biggers Bros., 222 S.W. 1112 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1920); and Lovett v. Eastern Oil Co., 68 W. Va. 667, 70 S.E. 707 (1911).
Those suits attacking leases on the ground of lack of consideration not actually brought
by lessors or their successors often arise when the lessor, or his successor in interest,
in the belief that the first lease is void for want of consideration, leases to a second
lessee. The law suit is then brought to adjudicate the rights of the rival lessees. Carter
Oil Co. v. Owen, 27 F. Supp. 74 (E.D. Ill. 1939) ; Lindlay v. Raydure, 239 Fed. 928
(E.D. Ky. 1917), aff'd, 249 F. 675 (6th Cir. 1918); Brinkman v. Empire Gas and
Fuel Co., 120 Kan. 602, 245 Pac. 1U7 (1926) ; Union Gas & Oil Co. v. Wiedeman Oil
Co., 211 Ky. 361, 277 S.W. 323 (1925); Brown v. Fowler, 65 Ohio St. 507, 63 N.E.
76 (1901).
52. Fuller, Consideration and Form, 41 COL. L. REv. 799, 805 (1941).
53. Id. at 805, 815.
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by the less artificial of the synthetic formalities-writing, signing and de-
livery---could hardly b& enhanced by the passage of one dollar.
With no discernible contribution to make to the community policies
underlying form, consideration stays on in oil and gas law only as a snare to
the uncounseled and an absolution to the welcher. The justification for its
presence even under traditional doctrine is shaky ;54 its existence in a policy-
oriented scheme of law would be indefensible. Whatever technical term is
used to describe an oil and gas lease, whether a contract, conveyance,66
deed,57 grant in praesenti,58 lease,5 9 not a lease,00 license,0 ' option,02 or
sale ;63 whatever label is affixed to the lessee's interest, consideration simply
does not pull its weight as a formal requirement in oil and gas leasing.
Nevertheless, courts still discuss consideration in oil and gas cases.
Significantly, however, their references to the doctrine are largely confined
to approval of whatever is held out as consideration in the case sub judice.04
Rarely have modem opinions expressly catalogued consideration as a basic
requirement for the creation of the oil and gas lessee's interest ;65 seldom,
with the exception of the Louisiana courts, have they avoided leases for
lack of it.6
54. See note 37 supra.
55. Rogers v. Magnolia Oil & Gas Co., 156 Ark. 103, 245 S.W. 802, 803 (1922);
Pittsburg Vitrified Paving & Building Brick Co. v. Bailey, 76 Kan. 42, 90 Pac. 803,
'804 (1907); Beckett-Iseman Oil Co. v. Backer, 165 Ky. 818, 178 S.W. 1084 (1915);
Murray v. Barnhart, 117 La. 1023, 42 So. 489, 490, 491 (1906) ; De Hart v. "Enrigbt,
93 Misc. 213, 157 N.Y. Supp. 46, 50 (Sup. Ct. 1916); Walla Walla Oil, Gas & Pipe
Line Co. v. Vallentine, 103 Wash. 359, 174 Pac. 980, 981 (1918).
56. Miles v. Jerry, 158 Ark. 314, 250 S.W. 34, 35 (1923); Gillespie v. Fulton
Oil & Gas Co., 236 Ill. 188, 86 N.E. 219, 225 (1908); Watson v. Rochmill, 137 Tex.
565, 155 S.W.2d 783, 784 (1941) ; Jones v. Bevier, 59 S.W.2d 945, 948 (Tex. Civ. App.
1933); Schmidt v. Baar, 283 S.W. 1115, 1117 (Tex. Civ. App. 1926); Canon v. Scott,
230 S.W. 1042, 1046 (Tex. Civ. App. 1921).
57. Mound City Brick & Gas Co. v. Goodspeed Gas & Oil Co., 83 Kan. 136, 109 Pac.
1002, 1004 (1910); Test Oil Co. v. La Tourette, 19 Okla. 214, 91 Pac. 1025, 1029
(1907); Texas Co. v. Daugherty, 107 Tex. 226, 176 S.W. 717, 719 (1915); Davis v.
Texas Co., 232 S.W. 549, 556 (Tex. Civ. App. 1921).
58. Brewster v. Lanyon Zinc Co., 140 Fed. 801, 807 (8th Cir. 1905); Rich v.
Doneghey, 71 Okla. 204, 177 Pac. 86, 90 (1918).
59. See, e.g., Brown v. Fowler, 65 Ohio St. 507, 63 N.E. 76, 80 (1901).
60. Pittsburg Vitrified Paving & Building Brick Co. v. Bailey, 76 Kan. 42, 90
Pac. 803, 804 (1907) ; Rich v. Doneghey, 71 Okla. 204, 177 Pac. 86, 90 (1918).
61. Pittsburg Vitrified Paving & Building Brick. Co. v. Bailey, 76 Kan. 42, 90 Pac.
803, 804 (1907) ; Walla Walla Oil, Gas & Pipe Line Co. v. Vallentine, 103 Wash. 359,
174 Pac. 980, 981 (1918).
62. Carter Oil Co. v. Owen, 27 F. Supp. 74, 80 (E.D. Ill. 1939); Pittsburg
Vitrified Paving & Building Brick Co. v. Bailey, 76 Kan. 42, 90 Pac. 803, 805 (1907);
Bost v. Biggers Bros. 222 S.W. 1112, 1115 (Tex. Civ. App. 1920).
63. Noxon v. Cockburn, 147 S.W.2d 872, 874 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941); Guerra v.
Chancellor, 103 S.W.2d 775, 778 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937).
64. See, e.g., Greer v. Carter Oil Co., 373 Ili. 168, 25 N.E.2d 805 (1940) (seal
held to import consideration) ; Riffle v. Dieter, 159 Kan. 628, 157 P.2d 831 (1945) (oil
and gas lease held within coverage of a statute providing that a contract in writing,
signed by party bound thereby, imports consideration).
65. For cases so holding, see, e.g., Remple v. Shell Petroleum Corp., 134 Kan. 350,
5 P.2d 1094 (1931) ; Brinkman v. Empire Gas & Fuel Co., 120 Kan. 602, 245 Pac. 107
(1926).
66. The lease was avoided for this reason in Remple v. Shell Petroleum Corp., 134
Kan. 350, 5 P.2d 1094 (1931). For the Louisiana situation, see notes 77, 78, infra.
[ Vol,. S
OIL AND GAS LESSEE'S INTEREST
Prior to the advent of the escape clauses in oil and gas leases, con-
sideration was most often present by way of covenants on the part of the
lessee to drill a well. 67 When economic and legal changes brought about the
addition of the surrender clause to the "drill or pay" lease and the
origination of the "unless" drilling clause, covenants to drill no longer
served as consideration, for the lessee could escape his obligation by exercising
the surrender clause under the "drill or pay" lease or by allowing the lease
to lapse under an "unless" lease.6 8 Hence, absent any initial cash payment,
there was no traditionally recognized consideration in a lease containing an.
escape clause for the lessee's benefit. A drafting strategem stipulating for
the payment of one dollar as a condition precedent to the exercise of the
surrender clause was devised to save the "drill or pay" lease with a sur-
render clause and no initial cash consideration. With such a clause, considera-
tion was undeniably present, for the lessee was irrevocably bound to do one
of three things, drill a well, pay delay rental or pay one dollar in order to
surrender.6 9
The coming of escape clauses in oil arid gas leasing focused attention in
consideration litigation on the initial cash consideration, for with no binding
promises to satisfy formality-minded courts any longer, only this remained to
uphold the lease. The principal inquiry then became how much initial cash
payment would be "sufficient" consideration. With the sole exception of
Louisiana, shackled by the civil law concept of "serious" consideration, the
cases have stood unanimously for the proposition that nominal consideration
is "sufficient" consideration to support an oil and gas lease.70 Leading to
this conclusion are several factors. Among them must be counted the
compromise aspect of the recognition of nominal consideration as "suffi-
cient." As it has been shown, the role of consideration in furthering the
67. See Professor Summer's masterly treatment of this subject in 2 SuammxzS,
OIL AND GAS §§ 237-43 (Perm. ed. 1938).
68. See note 50 supra.
69. Rich v. Doneghey, 71 Okla. 204, 177 Pac. 86 (1918) ; 2 SUMMERs, OIL AND GAS
§ 239 (Perm. ed. 1938).
.70. Brewster v. Lanyon Zinc Co., 140 Fed. 801 (8th Cir. 1905); Carter Oil Co.
v. Owen, 27 F. Supp. 74 (E.D. Ill. 1939); Lindlay v. Raydure, 239 Fed. 928 (E.D. Ky.
1917), aff'd, 249 Fed. 675 (6th Cir. 1918); Rechard v. Cowley, 202 Ala. 337, 80 So. 419
(1918) ; Rogers v. Magnolia Oil & Gas Co., 156 Ark. 103, 245 S.W. 802 (1922) ; Poe v.
Ulrey, 233 Ill. 56, 84 N.E. 46 (1908); Brinkman v. Empire Gas & Fuel Co., 120 Kan.
602, 245 Pac. 107 (1926) ; Pittsburg Vitrified Paving & Building Brick Co. v. Bailey, 76
Kan. 42, 90 Pac. 803 (1907) ; Gray-Mellon Oil Co. v. Fairchild, 219 Ky. 143, 292 S.W.
743 (1927); Union Gas & Oil Co. v. Wiedeman Oil Co., 211 Ky. 361, 277 S.W. 323
(1925) ; Brown v. Fowler, 65 Ohio St. 507, 63 N.E. 76 (1901) ; Garber v. Hauser, 76
Okla. 292, 185 Pac. 436 (1919) ; Rich v. Doneghey, 71 Okla. 204, 177 Pac. 86 (1918)1;
Bost v. Biggers Bros., 222 S.W. 11.12 (Tex. Civ. App. 1920); Lovett v. Eastern Oil
Co., 68 W. Va. 667, 70 S.E. 707 (1911). It is also settled that sufficient initial con-
sideration supports every promise in the lease. Brewster v. Lanyon Zinc Co., supra;
Lindlay v. Raydure, supra; Rogers v. Magnolia Oil & Gas Co., supra; Pittsburg
Vitrified Paving and Building Brick Co. v. Bailey, supra; Union Gas &, Oil Co. v.
Wiedeman, supra; Brown v. Fowler, supra; Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Connellee, 11
S.W.2d 158 (Tex. Comm. App. 1928).
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community demand for serious-minded agreement-makers is a dubious one,
yet if some courts still require consideration, they should be satisfied at the
least expense to the resource development and planning process. Clearly
nominal consideration is that least likely to hinder free initiative petroleum
development agreement-making by its burdens. If pay for functionless
antiquities we must, let us do so cheaply.
Then, too, with the elements of speculation and risk inherent in oil and
gas production transactions, who can say that the mineral rights to a tract
of land in unproven territory are worth more than a nominal sum, for, "It
may be that one dollar is all or even more that the oil and gas interest is
worth." 1 One court concerned with the sufficiency of one dollar given for
mineral rights to a tract of land fifteen miles from producing territory opined
that, "An economical person . . .would consider the price paid for the lease
extravagant. ' 72 The time honored maxim that the law will not enter into
an inquiry as to the adequacy of consideration 73 seems peculiarly applicable
to the oil and gas situation where rights of indeterminate value are being
dealt with. 74 Titles are more settled and resource agreement-making is more
smooth when the participants are allowed to place their own final evaluation
on the mineral rights in question, free from judicial interference except in
cases of fraud or other foul play. Case after case has held that in "wildcat"
territory the slightest consideration is sufficient. 70 In the more proven areas
judicial intervention is made unnecessary by the natural formality of
exchange,71 innate in oil and gas leasing, which sets the initial consideration
at what almost invariably is the market value of the interests involved.
Only Louisiana saddles its judiciary with the burden of determining the
value of a right to explore for and produce oil and gas in cases where the
adequacy of the consideration is challenged. This civil law position is
enunciated in Murray v. Barnhart,77 which held, "But under our law, the
consideration 'must be serious': 'it must not be out of all proportion with
71. Rich v. Doneghey, 71 Okla. 204, 177 Pac. 86, 94 (1918).
72. Brinkman v. Empire Gas & Fuel Co., 120 Kan. 602, 245 Pac. 107, 110 (1926).
73. RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 81 (1932); 1 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 115 (Rev.
ed. 1936).
74. Union Gas & Oil Co. v. Wiedeman Oil Co., 211 Ky. 361, 277 S.W. 323 (1925).
75. Lindlay v. Raydure, 239 Fed. 675 (6th Cir. 1918); Greer v. Carter Oil Co.,
373 Ill. 168, 25 N.E.2d 805 (1940); Brinkman v. Empire Gas & Fuel Co., 120 Kan.
602, 245 Pac. 107 (1926) ; Garber v. Hauser, 76 Okla. 292, 185 Pac. 436 (1919) ; Rich
v. Doneghey, 71 Okla. 204, 177 Pac. 86 (1918); Freeman v. Parks, 102 S.W.2d 291
(Tex. Civ. App. 1937) ; Bost v. Biggers Bros., 222 S.W. 1112 (Tex. Civ. App. 1920);
Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Connellee, 11 S.W.2d 158 (Tex. Comm. App. 1928).
76. "[T]he most important characteristic of exchange is that it is a situation in
which the interests of the transacting parties are opposed, so that the social utility
of the contract is guaranteed in some degree by the fact that it emerges as a com-
promise of those conflicting interests." Fuller, Consideration and Form, 41 COL. L. REv.
799, 817 (1941). See also FEsox, THE RATIONAL BASIS OF CONTRACTS 13-28 (1949).
77. 117 La. 1023, 42 So. 489, 491 (1906).
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the value of the thing.'" That the task of the Louisiana courts is not an
enviable one is apparent from the number and complexity of their recent
cases on this subject.
78
One issue in the field of oil and gas consideration on which authority
has been divided is the effect to be given a recital of consideration.7 9 Poe v.
Ulrey80 states one view as follows: "It is true that for the purpose of
applying equitable principles and granting equitable remedies a court of
equity will inquire into the real consideration of a contract . . . if the effect
is not to impair the instrument as a conveyance. . . But while the recital
of the payment of the consideration may be contradicted for such purposes,
an acknowledgment of such payment cannot be contradicted by parol for
the purpose of invalidating the instrument or impairing its legal effect as
a conveyance." 8' Perhaps this seemingly arbitrary rule is only a thin
legalistic veil over the sound policy norm that it is not desirable to overturn
otherwise valid oil and gas leases simply because strict obeisance was not
paid to ineffectual formal requirements. Stated another way, the danger to
the petroleum development agreement-making process threatened by a
doctrine which would allow the contradiction of recitals by parol evidence
greatly outweighs any benefit to the community policies underlying form
gained from requiring lessees actually to pay the money acknowledged as
received by the lessor. The task of getting a free influx of capital into the
risky oil production industry is difficult enough without increasing the
instability of titles, the inevitable result of allowing parol contradiction of
consideration recitals. Nor does it appear that the contribution to the com-
munity policies underlying form resulting from a recital of consideration
made for the very reason of satisfying these community demands is ap-
preciably less than the supposed contribution to these policies rendered by
the actual handing over of a dollar.
4. Delivery
Although scant attention is devoted to the issue in the decisions, it
seems clear that delivery is essential to the creation of the oil and gas
lessee's interest in all states where the problem has presented itself.
82 Most
78. Jones v. First National Bank, 215 La. 862, 41 So.2d 811 (1949) ; Noxon v.
Union Oil Co. of California, 210 La. 1074, 29 So.2d 67 (1946); Lee v. Perkins, 195
La. 939, 197 So. 607 (1940); Smith v. Tullos, 195 La. 400, 196 So. 912 (1940).
79. 1 CoIN, CONTRAcTS § 130 (1950); 2 SUMMERS, OIL AND GAS § 243 (Perm.
ed. 1938).
80. 233 Ill. 56, 84 N.E. 46 (1908).
81. 84 N.E. at 49. See also 4 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY § 984 (3d ed. 1939).
82. Bledsoe v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 36 F. Supp. 531 (E.D. Ill. 1941) ; Jordan
v. Winooski Say. Bank, 187 Ark. 212, 58 S.W.2d 942 (1933); Rockefeller v. Smith,
104 Cal. App. 544, 286 Pac. 487 (1930); Pure Oil Co. v. Evans, 369 Ill. 416, 17
N.E.2d 23 (1938) ; Hughes v. Franklin, 201 Miss. 215, 29 So.2d 79 (1947) ; Wahby v.
Renegar, 199 Okla. 191, 185 P.2d 184 (1947); Davenport v. Doyle Petroleum Corp.,
190 Okla. 548, 126 P.2d 57 (1942) ; Kidd v. Karns, 181 Okla. 17, 72 P.2d 391 (1937) ;
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of the opinions on the question of delivery launch immediately into the
sufficiency of the alleged delivery in issue, omitting entirely any discussion
on whether delivery is an indispensable formal requirement in oil and gas
leasing, and thereby assume the point.8 3 Moreover, those courts not content
with bland assumptions8 4 satisfy themselves with such statements as, "The
general rule with reference to the execution of written instruments is that
delivery constitutes an essential element thereof. .... -5
Inquiry into the part played in delivery. cases by the words employed
to describe the lessee's interest leads to the observation that these labels are
not variables of any consequence in this area. Delivery is quite as much
a requirement for the creation of the oil and gas lessee's interest in Cali-
fornia"0 and Oklahoma sT where it has been denoted a "profit a prendre"8 s
as in Texas s9 where it has been held to be a "determinable fee"9 0 and
Illinois91 where it is described as a "freehold. '9 2 Nor is the name given the
dispositive instrument itself a factor of any import. The oil and gas lease
has at different times and for various purposes been characterized as a
"deed" in Kansas, 93 Oklahoma9 4 and Texas ;9 a "sale"90n and a "conveyance"''
Bell v. Rudd, 144 Tex. 491, 191 S.W.2d 841 (1946); Pelican Oil & Gas Co. v. Edson
Petroleum Co., 123 S.W.2d 696 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939); Porter v. Cluck, 13 S.W.2d
130 (Tex. Civ. App. 1929); First State Bank of Wortham v. Bland, 291 S.W. 650
(Tex. Civ. App. 1927) ; Schmidt v. Baar, 283 S.W. 1115 (Tex. Civ. App. 1926) ; Rails
v. Woods, 291 S.W. 532 (Tex. Comm. App. 1927).
83. Bledsoe v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 36 F. Supp. 531 (E.D. Ill. 1941) ; Jordan
v. Winooski Sav. Bank, 187 Ark. 212, 58 S.W.2d 942 (1933); Rockefeller v. Smith,
104 Cal. App. 544, 286 Pac. 487 (1930) ; Pure Oil Co. v. Evans, 369 Ill. 416, 17 N.E.2d
23 (1938) ; Wahby v. Renegar, 199 Okla. 191, 185 P.2d 184 (1947) ; Davenport v. Doyle
Petroleum Corp., 190 Okla. 548, 126 P.2d 57 (1942) ; Kidd v. Karns, 181 Okla. 17, 72
P.2d 391 (1937); Bell v. Rudd, 144 Tex. 491, 191 S.W.2d 841 (1946); Pelican Oil
& Gas Co. v. Edson Petroleum Co., 123 S.W.2d 696 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939); Ralls v.
Woods, 291 S.W. 532 (Tex. Comm. App. 1927).
84. Some consideration is given to the problems in Hughes v. Franklin, 201
Miss. 215, 29 So.2d 79 (1947) ; Porter v. Cluck, 13 S.W.2d 130 (Tex. Civ. App. 1929) ;
First State Bank of Wortham v. Bland, 291 S.W. 650 (Tex. Civ. App. 1927) ; Schmidt
v. Baar, 283 S.W. 1115 (Tex. Civ. App. 1926); Ralls v. Woods, 291 S.W. 532 (Tex.
Comm. App. 1927).
85. Schmidt v. Baar, 283 S.W. 1115, 1117 (Tex. Civ. App. 1926).
86. Rockefeller v. Smith, 104 Cal. App. 544, 286 Pac. 487 (1930).
87. Wahby v. Renegar, 199 Okla. 191, 185 P.2d 184 (1947); Davenport v. Doyle
Petroleum Corp., 190 Okla. 548, 126 P.2d 57 (1942); Kidd v. Karns, 181 Okla. 17,
72 P.2d 391 (1937).
88. See, e.g., Dabney-Johnston Oil Corp. v. Walden, 4 Cal.2d 637, 52 P.2d 237, 243
(1935) ; Rich v. Doneghey, 71 Okla. 204, 177 Pac. 86, 89 (1918).
89. Schmidt v. Barr, 283 S.W. 1115 (Tex. Civ. App. 1926) ; and see other Texas
cases cited in note 82 .supra.
90. See, e.g., Jones v. Bevier, 59 S.W.2d 945, 948 (Tex. Civ. App. 1933).
91. Bledsoe v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 36 F. Supp. 531 (E.D. Ill. 1941).
92. See, e.g., Pure Oil Co. v. Evans, 369 Ill. 416, 17 N.E. 23, 24 (1938); Poe v.
Ulrey, 233 Ill. 56, 84 N.E. 46, 48 (1908).
93. Mound City Brick & Gas Co. v. Goodspeed Gas & Oil Co., 83 Kan. 136, 109
Pac. 1002, 1004 (1910).
94. Test Oil Co. v. La Tourette, 19 Okla. 214, 91 Pac. 1025, 1029 (1907).
95. Texas Co. v. Daugherty, 107 Tex. 226, 176 S.W. 717, 719 (1915); Davis
v. Texas Co., 232 S.W. 549, 556 (Tex. Civ. App. 1921).
96. Noxon v. Cockburn, 147 S.W.2d 872, 874 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941); Guerra v.
Chancellor, 103 S.W.2d 775, 778 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937).
97. Watson v. Rochmill, 137 Ten. 565, 155 S.W.2d 783, 784 (1941); Jones v.
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in Texas; a "license"0 8 in Oklahoma; and a "contract" in the federal courts 9"
California, 10 0 Oklahoma' l and Texas ;102 and yet in all of these jurisdictions
delivery has been held necessary to the validity of the instrument.,
0 3
As a formality, delivery, one of the most intrinsic of all formalities, can
hardly be found a hindrance to the agreement-making process. This is
particularly so now that delivery is no longer restricted to the "crude con-
ception of manual transfer."' 0 4 Certainly the community is justified in re-
quiring some manifestation on the part of the grantor that he intends the
oil and gas lease in question to be legally operative.10 5 The cautionary
features of physically transferring an instrument to the grantee, or to a
third person in his behalf, or of any other show of intent to put the instru-
ment out of the grantor's control, are apparent. Human experience alone,
without legal promptings, should be adequate to impress on the grantor that
this is the culminating act of the agreement-making process-retractable be-
fore, irretrievable thereafter.
Once it is accepted that delivery of oil and gas leases is necessary, the
troublesome problems of sufficiency of delivery arising in the cases are not
unlike those of delivery of real estate deeds, nor are their solutions, especially
in the conditional delivery cases, any more predictable.
5. Acknowledgment
Save in certain situations believed by the community to warrant
stronger evidentiary and cautionary safeguards, acknowledgment is gen-
erally not a minimum requisite for the creation of the oil and gas lessee's
interest, as between the parties to the agreement.'
0 6 The questions in which
acknowledgment becomes an important, even vital, element are those in-
volving recording, homestead extinguishment, the transfer of community
property and the admission of records into evidence.
10 7 Although the prin-
Bevier, 56 S.W.2d 945, 948 (Tex. Civ. App. 1933); Canon v. Scott, 230 S.W. 1042,
1046 (Tex. Civ. App. 1921).
98. Michell v. Probst, 52 Okla. 10, 152 Pac. 597, 599 (1915).
99. Federal Oil Co. v. Western Oil Co.. 112 Fed. 373. 375 (D. Ind. 1902), aff'd,
121 Fed. 674 (7th Cir. 1902).
100. Carlisle v. Lady, 109 Cal. App. 567, 293 Pac. 686, 688 (1930).
101. Brown v. Wilson, 58 Okla. 392, 160 Pac. 94, 99, 100 (1916).
102. Wilson v. Gass, 289 S.W. 141, 142 (Tex. Civ. App. 1902); National Oil &
Pipe Line Co. v. Teel, 67 S.W. 545, 547 (Tex. Civ. App. 1902).
103. See note 82 supra.
104. 4 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY § 1034 (3d ed. 1939).
105. McDOUGAL AND HABER, PROPERTY, WEALTH AND LAND:" ALLOCATION,
PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT 595-96 (1948).
106. Wahby v. Renegar, 199 Okla. 191, 185 Pac. 184 (1947) ; Roach v. Junction
Oil & Gas Co., 72 Okla. 213, 179 Pac. 934 (1919); Johnson v. Russell, 220 S.W. 352
(Tex. Civ. App. 1920). But see Miles v. Jerry, 158 Ark. 314, 250 S.W. 34,.35 (1923),
where the court said, "A proper acknowledgment is an essential part of the execution
of a conveyance of land. .. ."
107. See, e.g., ILL. L. REv. STAT. c.30, § 19 (1949) ; KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 67-229
(1935); OKLA. STAT. tit. 16, § 27 (1941); TEX. STAT., REv. Civ. art. 3726 (1948).
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cipal function of acknowledgment is to serve as a prerequisite to recording, 08
it is not uncommon to find acknowledgment as essential to the validity of
conveyances affecting homestead'0 9 or the wife's separate property in a com-
munity property state." 0
The primary question, all too often glossed over in the opinions, is
what these statutes have to do with oil and gas leases at all. Why should
an oil and gas lease be required or even permitted to be acknowledged when
representative acknowledgment statutes proclaim their scope with no direct
reference to petroleum interests?"'
Does the answer depend on the nature of the lessee's interest and of
the instrument disposing it? In Oklahoma, where the lessee's interest is often
called a "profit a prendre"112 and has been described as a "chattel real" and
"personalty,"' ' 3 the statute applies to "an instrumnent affecting the title to
real property." In Texas, where the lessee's interest is generally denominated
"a determinable fee,"" 4 the statute refers to a "conveyance of real estate."
In Kansas the statute covers a "conveyance of land, or of any other estate
or interest therein," but in that state the lessee's interest has been bluntly
held to be not an "estate in the land.""' ; In Illinois, where the lessee's
interest is usually characterized obscurely as a "freehold,""' 0 the statute
applies to "other writings of or relating to the sale, conveyance or other
disposition of lands or real estate or any other interest therein." It is
noteworthy that each of the four above-mentioned illustrative states, work-
ing with dissimilar statutes and irreconcilable conceptions of the character
of the lessee's interest, reached exactly the same result in holding that oil
and gas leases are covered by acknowledgment statutes ;117 it is even more
108. See, e.g., ILL. REv. STAT. c.30, § 24 (1949); KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 67-221
(1935); OKLA. STAT. tit. 16, § 26 (1941); TEx. STAT., Rv. Civ. art. 1294 (1948).
109. See, e.g., ILL. RFv. STAT. c.52, § 4 (1949); TEX. STAT., REv. Cirv. art. 1300
(1948).
110. See, e.g., Tax. STAT., Rrv. Civ. art. 1299 (1948).
111. "Deeds, mortgages, conveyances, releases, powers of attorney or other vritings
of or relating to the sale, conveyance or other disposition of real estate or any interest
therein. . . ." ILL. REv. STAT. c.30, § 19 (1949). "All conveyances, and other interests
affecting real estate. . . ." KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 67-211 (1935). "All deeds,
mortgages, conveyances or other instruments affecting the title to real property .... "
OKLA. STAT. tit. 16, § 39a (1941). "Every deed or conveyance of real estate...." TEx.
STAT., Rav. Civ. art. 1294 (1948).
112. See, e.g., Rich v. Doneghey, 71 Okla. 204, 177 Pac. 86, 89 (1918).
113. Duff v. Keaton, 33 Okla. 92, 124 Pac. 291, 294, 295 (1912).
114. See, e.g., Stephens County v. Mid-Kansas Oil and Gas Co., 113 Tex. 160, 254
S.W. 290, 295 (1923).
115. Beardsley v. Kansas Natural Gas Co., 78 Kan. 571, 96 Pac. 859, 860 (1908).
116. See, e.g., Daughetee v. Ohio Oil Co., 263 Ill. 518, 105 N.E. 308, 310 (1914);
Watford Oil & Gas Co. v. Shipman, 233 Ill. 9, 84 N.E. 53, 54 (1908).
117. Miles v. Jerry, 158 Ark. 314, 250 S.W. 34 (1923); Gillespie v. Fulton Oil &
Gas Co., 236 Ill. 188, 86 N.E. 219 (1908) ; Poe v. Ulrey, 233 Ill. 56, 84 N.E. 46
(1908); Hester v. O'Rear, 202 Ky. 176, 259 S.W. 41 (1924); Roach v. Junction Oil
& Gas Co., 72 Okla. 213, 179 Pac. 934 (1919) ; Carter Oil Co. v. Popp, 70 Okla. 232,
174 Pac. 747 (1918); Fagan v. Texas Co., 220 S.W. 346 (Tex. Civ. App. 1920);
Hamilton County Development Co. v. Sullivan, 220 S.W. 116 (Tex. Civ. App. 1920);
McEntire v. Thomason, 210 S.W. 563 (Tex. Civ. App. 1919); Southern Oil Co. v.
Colquitt, 69 S.W. 169 (Tex. Civ. App. 1902).
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remarkable that they did so almost by assumption, with virtually no discus-
sion of the point at all in the opinions. This must give us pause to reflect
on the true role of the legal terms used to describe the lessee's interest. We
are compelled to question whether they actually are, as they are held out
to be, consequential factors in deciding law suits.
If it is settled that in certain cases oil and gas leases must be
acknowledged, we must next examine the utility of acknowledgment as a
formality. Is its burden to the free creation of oil and gas interests"1
8
outweighed by its benefits to the policies underlying form? The wide-spread
requirement that an oil and gas lease be acknowledged before it may be
recorded has a sound formal basis. If the community is to be asked to bring
its compulsive forces to bear to protect a recorded lease against otherwise
innocent parties it is not unreasonable that the creator of the protected instru-
ment be required to manifest a solemnity of purpose before an appropriate
official. Some jurisdictions demand special acknowledgments where a mar-
ried woman makes an oil and gas lease affecting her homestead or separate
property, sometimes requiring that her acknowledgment be taken apart from
her spouse and that the notary explain the transaction to her." 9 This attempt
to erect a cautionary barrier around womanhood has frequently impeded the
free creation of oil and gas interests and has left a wake of assailable titles.
120
It is plainly open to question whether this obstruction to free-volition agree-
ment-making can be counter-balanced by any community policy founded on
the crumbling theory of the existence of a weaker sex, dependent on legal
formalities for protection against domineering spouses. Such statutes are, in
the second half of the twentieth century, on shaky sociological footings and
are disappearing in all but the most chivalric areas.12' However, the home-
stead acts requiring acknowledgment, based on the community policy of
118. That acknowledgment has proved an obstruction to the free creation of oil
and gas leases is shown by the number of appellate cases in which leases have been
attacked on the ground of missing or defective acknowledgments. See the cases
enumerated in note 117 supra and the following: Franklin Land Co. v. Wea Gas, Coal
& Oil Co., 43 Kan. 518, 23 Pac. 630 (1890); Brandenburg v. Petroleum Exploration
Co., 218 Ky. 557, 291 S.W. 757 (1927) ; Terry v. Humphreys, 27 N.M. 564, 203 Pac.
539 (1922) ; Wahby v. Renegar, 199 Okla. 191, 185 P.2d 184 (1947) ; Gulf Production
Co. v. Continental Oil Co., 139 Tex. 183, 164 S.W.2d 488 (1942); English v. Plumlee,
291 S.W. 922 (Tex. Civ. App. 1927); Cooper v. Casselberry, 230 S.W. 231 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1921); Richmond v. Hog Creek Oil Co., 229 S.W. 563 (Tex. Civ. App. 1920);
Davis v. Burkholder, 218 S.W. 1101 (Tex. Civ. App. 1920).
119. See, e.g., TEx. STAT., REv. Civ. art. 6605 (1948).
120. Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. Downey, 143 Tex. 171, 183 S.W.2d 426 (1944),
23 TEXAS L. Rxv. 284 (1945); Cooper v. Casselberry, 230 S.W. 231 (Tex. Civ. App.
1921); Richmond v. Hog Creek Oil Co., 229 S.W. 563 (Tex. Civ. App. 1921); May-
nard v. Gilliam, 225 S.W. 818 (Tex. Civ. App. 1920); Fagan v. Texas Co., 220 S.W.
346 (Tex. Civ. App. 1920); Hamilton County Development Co. v. Sullivan, 220 S.W.
116 (Tex. Civ. App. 1920); Texas Co. v. Keeter, 219 S.W. 521 (Tex. Civ. App. 1920);
Davis v. Burkholder, 218 S.W. 1101 (Tex. Civ. App. 1920); McEntire v. Thomason,
210 S.W. 763 (Tex. Civ. App. 1919); Southern Oil Co. v. Colquitt, 69 S.W. 169 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1902).
121. 4 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY § 1031 (3d ed. 1939).
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seeking serious-mindedness in agreements affecting the homestead interest,
but which prescribe no special rites for the female participant, are defensible
formality-wise.
6. Recording
Recording, like its prerequisite formality, acknowledgment, is generally
not an essential requirement for the creation of the oil and gas lessee's interest.
It assumes importance only on the entry of third parties into the con-
troversy.122 Although it is true that some states have statutes expressly
covering the recording of mineral interests,
123 all too often they do not.124
This leaves the extremely important resource planning decision of whether
oil and gas leases are within the scope of the recording acts to be made on
the hypertechnical issue of the nature of the leasing instrument and the
interest which it passes. For without a specific statute oil and gas leases are
recordable only if they fall within the purview of statutes apparently drawn
with no consideration of mineral interests.125 Here again the courts find
122. "The fact that the lease was not recorded until after the conveyance to
appellee did not affect its validity as between the parties thereto nor as to third
persons . .. unless they were purchasers for value without notice. . . ." English v.
Plumlee, 291 S.W. 922, 923 (Tex. Civ. App. 1927). See also Blumrosen v. Burke, 296
S.W. 987 (Tex. Civ. App. 1927); Hester v. Shuster, 234 S.W. 713 (Tex. Civ. App.
1921).
123. KANt. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 79-420 (1935) : "That where the fee to the surface
of any tract, parcel or lot of land is in any person . . . and the right or title to any
minerals therein is in another or is in others, the right to such minerals therein shall be
valued and listed separately from the fee of such land, in separate entries and de-
scriptions, and such land itself and said right to the minerals therein shall be
separately taxed to the owners thereof respectively. . . . Provided, that when such
reserves or leases are not recorded within ninety days after execution, they shall
become void if not listed for taxation." For cases construing this statute, see Farmers'
Union Royalty Co. v. Hushaw, 307 U.S. 615, 59 Sup. Ct. 1046, 83 L. Ed. 1496 (1939);
and Volker v. Crumpaker, 154 Kan. 403, 118 P.2d 540 (1941).
Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 382.080 (1943) : "No deed conveying any title to or interest
in real property, or lease of oil, gas, coal or mineral right and privilege, for a longer
time than five years . . . shall be good against a purchaser for a valuable consideration
without notice thereof, or any creditor unless the deed is acknowledged by the party
who executes it, or is proved and lodged for record in the proper office, as prescribed
by law." S.D. Laws 1943, c.25, § 1: "No register of deeds shall accept for the
record in his office any deed, oil, gas or other mineral lease that does not contain
the post office address of the grantee or lessee and a legal description of the property
conveyed or leased."
124. E.g., Illinois, Oklahoma and Texas. However, OKLA. STAT. tit. 19 § 231
(1941) indirectly recognizes the recordability of oil and gas leases by authorizing
county clerks to hire more help in case an unusual increase in mineral leasing occurs
within any county.
125. Typical statutes of this type are: ILL. Rzv. STAT. c.30, § 27 (1949): "Deeds,
mortgages, powers of attorney, and other instruments relating to or affecting the title
to real estate in this state, shall be recorded. . . ." KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 67-221
(1935): "Every instrument in writing that conveys real estate, or whereby any real
estate may be affected, proved or acknowledged, and certified in the manner herein
before prescribed may be recorded. . . ." OxLA. STAT. tit. 16, § 15 (1941): "but no
deed, mortgage, contract, bond, lease or other instrument relating to real estate other
than a lease for a period not exceeding one year and accompanied by actual possession,
shall be valid as against third persons unless acknowledged and recorded." Texas
Acts 1951, c. 403, § 1: "The following instruments of writing ...are authorized to
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themselves having to make weighty policy judgments under the guise of
determining whether the lessee's interest "concerns lands or tenements" in
Texas; "affects real estate" in Kansas; "relates to or affects the title to real
estate" in Illinois; or "relates to real estate" in Oklahoma. As in other
situations where the nature of the lessee's interest has been held out as an
important factor in influencing the judicial response, despite the varying
and conflicting descriptions of that interest prevailing in the different states
and the difference in the wording of the statutes, all cases considering the
point have reached indentical conclusions-that oil and gas leases are
recordable instruments, 126 and, in fact, as against creditors and subsequent
purchasers for value without notice, must be recorded to be valid.1 2T
Any other result would be disastrous to effective petroleum planning
and development. An efficient recording system is essential for establishing
that stability and security of interest imperative to attract the free flow of
investment capital into the oil production industry necessary to keep
petroleum supply up to the ever rising demands of a rearmed nation. The
formal requirement of recording is not onerous. If one wishes the judicial
processes of the community set in motion to protect the interest granted
by a lease against otherwise innocent purchasers and creditors, it is not
unreasonable to require him to see that such a lease is noted in the proper
public books.
7. Conclusions and Alternatives
Legislatures have very largely omitted to set up formal requirements for
the creation of the oil and gas lessee's interest. This has placed on the courts
alone the task of declaring policy for the new and vigorous petroleum produc-
tion industry. In doing so they have been faced with the decision of whether
to fit oil and gas leases into existing statutes prescribing the formal re-
quirements for the more traditional instruments-statutes which were usually
drawn with no foresight of the impending discovery and production of oil
within the jurisdiction. The new oil and gas producing state is frequently
faced with the question of whether an oil and gas lease is to be included in
the coverage of a statute framed in language not specific to the issue--e.g.,
be recorded, viz.: all deeds, mortgages, conveyance, deeds of trust, bonds for title,
covenants, defeasances or other instruments of writing concerning any lands or
tenements ... .
126. Charles v. Roxana Petroleum Corp. 282 Fed. 983 (8th Cir. 1922); Derby
Oil Co. v. Bell, 134 Kan. 489, 7 P.2d 39 (1932) ; Cadillac Oil Co. v. Leonard, 203 Ky.
105, 261 S.W. 888 (1924); Baird v. Atlas Oil Co., 146 La. 1091, 84 So. 366 (1920);
Gulf Production Co. v. Continental Oil Co., 139 Tex. 183, 164 S.W.2d 488 (1942);
English v. Plumlee, 291 S.W. 922 (Tex. Civ. App. 1927); Witherspoon v. Green, 274
S.W. 170 (Tex. Civ. App. 1925).
127. Rader v. Schaffer, 186 Ky. 802, 218 S.W. 292 (1920); Hester v. Shuster,




whether a lease is included in a statute applying to "instruments of writing
concerning any lands or tenements"; then the court must translate its policy
decision on whether it is desirable to have oil and gas leases recorded into
terms of whether such a lease is an "instrument of writing concerning lands
or tenements." This entails discussions of the nature of the lessee's interest
which would lead the casual observer to believe that the label given the
lessee's interest by the courts is an important factor in influencing the court's
decision. It is here submitted that in the great majority of cases, the label
attached to the lessee's interest is not a factor in influencing the court's
decision, for the very choice of that description is, in fact, the decision
itself.128 That is, the lessee's interest is not necessarily a "tenement" or
"hereditament" in the abstract; it is a "tenement" or "hereditament" be-
cause the court has decided the interest should fall within a statute and to
get it within the statute the interest must be of that description. This is borne
out by the fact that, as we have seen, although the lessee's interest is de-
scribed in radically different ways by the various state courts, still on ques-
tions involving formalities they arrive at very similar results, most likely
because they are impelled by the same policy norms.
The alternatives are dear. The oil and gas production industry has long
since come of age. It should no longer be compelled to look for guidance to
statutes written in the years when petroleum was referred to as "Barbados
tar" or "rock oil" and used as a curiosity or a medicine. The importance of
the modern petroleum industry justifies a legislative program in all producing
states which will definitely state the community's policy toward formalities
with unambiguous reference to oil and gas interests-legislation which will
not hesitate to rid oil and gas agreement-making of formal antiquities
derived from nonanalogous situations in common law real property and
serving no useful purpose in modern oil and gas leasing.
128. 1 .SuMMEaS, OIL AND GAS 376 (Perm. ed. 1938).
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